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1. Introduction
In real life, mandatory transfers (e.g. public pensions, basic income, health care, public
education etc.) have multiple functions: (i) fight the distortionary effect of erroneous
private preferences, preferring standard good to merit goods; (ii) redistribute from the
rich to the poor or (iii) supply insurance against bad luck in incomplete markets. We
join that stream of the theoretical literature which neglected functions (ii) and (iii) and
concentrated on function (i). Therefore it is sufficient to postulate a representative indi-
vidual, who underestimates the real utility of merit goods with respect to the standard
good. There are two ways to obtain merit goods: publicly and privately. We assume
that buying one unit of merit good is cheaper than receive it as a transfer. The main
result of the paper, proved for three different models, is as follows: even if the govern-
ment can choose an optimal transfer, which yields higher social welfare than the private
optimum; there is a welfare gap of low transfers, which yield lower social welfare.
This result has two implications: (a) because there are two (local) maxima: one
private and one public, we have to compare them to determine the global maximum;
(b) even if the public optimum is superior to the private one, but the political opposition
compels the government to choose a transfer well below the social optimum, then the
society may end up with a lower welfare than not having contribution at all. We shall
numerically illustrate our findings.
To obtain public pension models, we specify standard goods as young-age consump-
tion and merit goods as old-age consumption, the transfer as public pension. Then
the three functions are realized as follows: (i) myopic workers discount the utility of
old-age consumption; (ii) the government ensures a minimum guaranteed pension; or
(iii) unisex indexed life annuity defends the pensioners against the longevity risk (Barr
and Diamond, 2008). In principle, this framework is suitable to characterize the so-
cially optimal pension system but in practice, the neglected complications should not
be forgotten.
Though the most obvious realization of these models are the public pension sys-
tems but other transfer systems like public spending on health or education can also be
analyzed with their help. For example, Peter Diamond suggested the following exam-
ple (personal communication): Assume that people dispose of garbage infrequently—
bothering their neighbors. The government introduces a more expensive garbage collec-
tion system. If the government collects garbage only a little more frequently than the
private equilibrium, then the public system only makes things worse. It takes a large
enough effort to make things better.
We shall consider three models: Model 1 (outlined above) is the simplest transfer
model with private saving when the individual discounts the merit good’s utility. Model
2 extends Model 1 when the individual also underestimates the size of the transfer but
the government does not. Model 3 is formulated as a pension model; we introduce
endogenous fertility into Model 1 and break down the tax: one part finances the child
benefits promoting fertility, the other part pays contributions for pensions. The new
phenomenon, jumping the gap is present in each of them.
In the remaining part of the Introduction, a very short review of the related pension
literature is given: Feldstein (1985) was the first studying the contradiction between
myopia and efficiency of private life-cycle saving in designing public pension system with
a simple model of representative agent (our Model 2). But due to his unrealistically
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high annual real interest rate (11.4%) and extremely low (sometimes zero) presumed-
to-actual benefit ratio, he ‘could’ neglect the whole problem of multiple maxima and
the arising gap; and that way he ‘proved’ the inefficiency of public transfers. (Though
he also analyzed workers of heterogeneous discount factors, we skip this complication.
Note, however, that by introducing means-testing for myopes, Feldstein (1987) somehow
improved his own evaluation of the public pension system.)
Since 1985, a lot of papers have been published on the optimal transfer systems,
including very sophisticated ones (e.g. the pioneering work by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987), using dynamic general equilibrium models). For pedagogical reasons, however,
we confine our attention to the very simple paternalistic models. (As Cremer and
Pestieau’s (2011) excellent survey emphasized, old paternalism advocates government
action against childish decisions of the individuals, new paternalism justifies intervention
in the name of the true self against the wrong self.)
In fact, it was van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) (for short, GLM) who for-
mulated Model 3 without excluding negative saving. I demonstrated the existence of
two optima and the phenomena of jumping the gap (Simonovits, 2013).
We continue our very selective survey with Cremer, De Donder, Maldonado and
Pestieau (2008), who extended Feldstein’s analysis to flexible labor supply, heteroge-
neous wages and redistributive pensions without having private life-cycle saving, ana-
lyzed the dependence of the socially optimal contribution rate on the model’s parameters
(e.g. the share of myopic workers, also discussed by Feldstein, 1985, Part II) and ob-
tained much more favorable results concerning optimal public pension systems than
Feldstein.
In the simplest pension model (Model 1, Simonovits, 2015a), I assumed homogeneous
wages and discount factors, while allowed for moderately efficient private savings. In a
further work (Simonovits, 2015b), I considered heterogeneous wages, and rather than
following Cremer et al. (2008) in neglecting the correlation between wages and discount
factors; the discount factor was made an increasing function of the wage and introduced
cap on the contribution base. In that framework, I could only determine the socially
optimal contribution rate and cap by numerical methods, therefore the issue of jumping
the gap was not emphasized.
At the end of the survey, it should be mentioned that both Feldstein (1985) and GLM
embedded their static models into a dynamic model of infinite stream of overlapping
generations, respectively. Furthermore, Feldstein chose a Lernerian rather than the
standard Samuelsonian social welfare function, i.e. he defined the one-period social
welfare function as the sum of the current young- and old-age consumption’s utilities
rather than the undiscounted lifetime utility function of a cohort. But to understand
our problem of jumping the gap, these complications can be safely ignored.
Moreover, working now with static models, we could have reduced the length of the
old-age period (or the weight of the merit good) to much less than 1, and make the
description more realistic. For example, choosing a factor 1/2, the optimal contribution
rate would drop from 1/2 to 1/3. To make the distance between the old and the new
models at a minimum, however, we have not followed Simonovits (2015b) and other
papers.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Sections 2-4 present
models 1, 2 and 3, respectively; and Section 5 concludes.
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2. Single discount
Model 1 (M1)
The quantities of the abstract transfer models are generally positive real numbers, except
if stated otherwise. The whole society is represented by a single individual, consuming
two goods in quantities c (ordinary good) and d (merit good). The individual’s pretax
earning is equal to 1. By paying s, he can buy ρs units of merit goods, where ρ > 1.
For comparability with Feldstein (1985), we introduce population and real wage growth
factors ν and γ, respectively, and their product, g = νγ > 1—being the growth factor
of the total wage. In addition, he must pay tax to the government, defined by the tax
rate t and he receives gt units of merit good as a benefit: 0 ≤ s, t ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ s+ t ≤ 1.
As is known, there is an important indicator, the relative interest factor which combines
the impact of the two parameters g and ρ:
R =
ρ
g
.
First assumption—the private purchase is more efficient than the public one:
R > 1. (A1)
We assume that the government and the representative individual play a Stackelberg-
duopoly game: first the government (as the leader) chooses t and then the individual (as
the follower) chooses s. Their objective functions V (t, s) and U(t, s) will be presented
below but will be abbreviated as V (t) and U(s), respectively. Making its decision, the
government anticipates the individual’s reaction to the transfer.
Then in our mixed public–private system, the consumption pair are equal to
c = 1− t− s and d = gt+ ρs = g(t+Rs). (1)
The individual has an additively separable Cobb–Douglas utility function
U(c, d) = log c+ δ log d, (2)
where δ is the discount factor of the utility of the merit good, 0 ≤ δ < 1.
Inserting the consumption equations (1) into the individual utility function (2), for
a given tax rate t, one obtains the reduced utility function:
U [s] = log(1− t− s) + δ log(t+Rs) + δ log g. (3)
If the tax rate is low enough, then the optimality condition and the optimal s are
respectively
U ′[s] = − 1
1− t− s +
δR
t+Rs
= 0, i.e. s =
δ(1− t)−R−1t
1 + δ
> 0;
otherwise (U ′[0] < 0) there is no purchase: s = 0.
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We define the separator tax rate tW as that tax rate at which the purchasing intention
for merit goods becomes just zero, i.e. tW is the unique root to the implicit equation
δR = δRtW + tW, i.e. tW =
δR
1 + δR
. (4)
We have now the following classification: for 0 ≤ t < tW, the purchasing intention
is positive; for tW ≤ t < 1, the purchasing intention is nonpositive. Because of the
existence of the credit constraint (CR), positive intentions are preserved (Slack CR),
while nonpositive intentions become zero purchase (Tight CR). The following branching
equations give the optimal consumption pair, where subindices S and T refer to S- and
T-branches, respectively.
Lemma 1. For any tax rate t, the optimal consumption pair are respectively equal
to
cS(t) =
1− t+R−1t
1 + δ
, dS(t) = δgRcS(t) if 0 ≤ t < tW (5S)
and
cT(t) = 1− t, dT(t) = gt if tW ≤ t < 1. (5T)
To fight myopia, the government evaluates the social welfare provided by a transfer
financed by tax rate t, with the undiscounted (paternalistic) social welfare function
V (t) = log c(t) + log d(t). (6)
To find its global maximum, we will separate the two cases of slack and tight credit
constraints.
By A1, both cS(t) and dS(t) are decreasing functions in 0 < t < tW (crowding-out
effect), therefore the corresponding S-optimum is achieved at t = 0, a corner maximum.
To obtain the T-optimum, take the derivative of V (t) in the second interval,
V ′(t) = − 1
1− t +
1
t
, tW ≤ t < 1.
Then V ′(t) is positive in interval [tW, 1/2) and negative in interval (1/2, 1). To make
the first interval nonempty, we have to assume that tW < 1/2, i.e. by (4),
δR < 1. (A2)
(5S) implies that for g = 1, A2 is equivalent to c(0) < d(0).
Lemma 2. Under assumptions A1–A2, the social welfare function V reaches its
T-maximum at t∗ = 1/2.
From now on, we confine our attention to interval [0, 1/2]. Obviously, separator tW
is now the worst S-tax rate in interval [0, 1/2) but it may not be so in other models (like
M2 below).
Compare the two optimal pairs of consumption:
c(0) =
1
1 + δ
, d(0) =
δgR
1 + δ
(S− optimum)
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and
c(1/2) =
1
2
, d(1/2) =
g
2
(T− optimum).
To have a meaningful model, in addition to c(0) > c(1/2) (due to myopia) we must
assume that d(0) < d(1/2) (the aim of coercion). Inserting the consumption values into
the second inequality, we arrive to our third assumption:
δR
1 + δ
<
1
2
, i.e. δ <
1
2R− 1 . (A3)
Note that A1 and A3 imply A2.
We are interested in that case when the T-optimal tax rate system is superior to the
S-optimum:
V (1/2) > V (0).
Inserting the corresponding formulas (5)–(6) into the last inequality results in the fourth
assumption:
−2 log 2 > −2 log(1 + δ) + log δ + logR. (A4)
It is easy to see that for any relative interest factor R > 1, there exists a critical discount
factor δR < 1, for which the two maximal welfares are equal to each other:
−2 log 2 = −2 log(1 + δR) + log δR + logR.
Solving the quadratic equation 1 + 2δ + δ2 = 4δR yields
δR = 2R− 1− 2
√
R2 −R.
Fixing the interest factor R > 1, for every subcritical discount factor δ, 0 < δ < δR,
there exists a neutral tax rate tN ∈ (tW, 1/2) for which the social welfare is the same as
at the transfer-free system. In formula:
log(1− tN) + log tN = −2 log(1 + δ) + log δ + logR.
A second quadratic equation arises: (1 + δ)2(tN − t2N) = δR yielding
tN =
1 + δ −√(1 + δ)2 − 4(1 + δ)δR
2(1 + δ)
.
We have arrived to
Theorem 1. Even if in M1, the optimal transfer system is superior to the transfer-
free system (A4), under A1 and A3, for any relative interest factor R and every subcrit-
ical discount factor δ, 0 < δ < δR, there exists an interval (0, tN) (with tN < 1/2) for
which any tax rate t in this interval delivers lower welfare than the transfer-free. Any
sensible tax rate should lie between tN and 1/2.
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Numerical illustrations
We shall now numerically illustrate our findings. Copying Feldstein’s annual population
growth factor ν[1] = 1.014 and his annual real wage growth factor γ[1] = 1.022, yielding
g[1] = ν[1]γ[1] ≈ 1.036. Considering 30-year-long life-stages, our illustration generates
from annual factors the 30-years cumulated factors:
δ = δ[1]30, ν = ν[1]30, γ = γ[1]30, g = g[1]30, ρ = ρ[1]30, R = R[1]30.
Our analysis only shows qualitative relations; for example, the critical δR is a de-
creasing function of R. Now Table 1 numerically demonstrates the strength of this
dependence. For example, in the second row of Table 1, the annual interest rate of 2%
defines an annual critical discount rate of cc. 5 percent. But increasing the relative
interest rate to 8%, the critical discount rate drops to cc. 11% (last row). The transfer-
free optimal young-age consumption grows from 0.754 to 0.975, while the corresponding
old-age consumption decreases from 0.958 to 0.741.
Table 1. Annual relative interest and critical discount factors: M1
N o t r a n s f e r
A n n u a l Young- Old-
relative interest critical discount a g e
f a c t o r c o n s u m p t i o n
R[1] δ[1] c(0) d(0)
1.01 0.963 0.754 0.958
1.02 0.947 0.835 0.865
1.03 0.935 0.883 0.818
1.04 0.924 0.916 0.789
1.05 0.913 0.938 0.770
1.06 0.904 0.954 0.757
1.07 0.894 0.966 0.748
1.08 0.886 0.975 0.741
τ∗T = 0.5, c
∗
T = 0.5 and d
∗
T = 1.44.
We continue the illustration of Theorem 1 in Table 2. To evaluate the welfare
properties of the optimal transfer system, we define the relative efficiency as a scalar ε,
by which multiplying the wage, and correspondingly the consumption pair of the private
system, the two social welfare values are equal. By simple calculation,
V (0) + 2 log ε = V (t∗), i.e. ε = exp[(V (t∗)− V (0))/2].
Let δ[1] = 0.9 and run R[1] between 1.01 and 1.06. Table 2 shows that the separator
tax rate tW is slowly rising from 0.054 to 0.196, while the neutral tax rate tN—the
minimum rational tax rate—is steeply rising from 0.056 to 0.339. The relative efficiency
of the public system drops from 2.18 to 1.056.
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Table 2. The impact of interest factor: M1
Optimal
Annual relative Separator Neutral public system’s
interest factor t a x r a t e relative efficiency
R[1] tW tN ε
1.01 0.054 0.056 2.180
1.02 0.071 0.077 1.881
1.03 0.093 0.106 1.625
1.04 0.121 0.149 1.406
1.05 0.155 0.215 1.218
1.06 0.196 0.339 1.056
Remark. Annual discount factor: δ[1] = 0.9.
3. Double discount
Model 2 (M2)
Following Feldstein (1985), in Model 2 we shall consider the case of double discounting.
(For added generality, we keep considering transfers not just pensions.) Let the real
α ∈ [0, 1] be the factor of underestimation of the transfer received, i.e. t˜ = αgt. Then
the individual (wrongly) expects to consume merit goods d˜ = αgt + ρs, his utility
function implies an elevated optimal purchase:
s˜ =
[δ(1− t)− αR−1t]+
1 + δ
, (7)
where x+ stands for the positive part of the real number x.
Note that for any tax rate t and for low enough α (e.g. α = 0), s˜ > 0 holds. Then
the first branch is
cS(t) =
1− (1− αR−1)t
1 + δ
and dS(t) = g
δR+ [1 + δ(1−R)− α]t
1 + δ
(8S)
and the second branch (5T) remains as before. Note, however, that the branching point
tW(α) =
δR
δR+ α
(9)
is a decreasing function of α, and at the extreme, tW(0) = 1, i.e. the T-interval becomes
empty. To have a local T-optimum, tW(α) < 1/2 must hold, i.e. we assume
α > δR (A5)
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(the fifth assumption). Due to A2, the feasibility interval (δR, 1) for α is not empty.
As an aside, note that cS(t) keeps decreasing but for low enough α, dS(t) can be
increasing for a while, namely if 1 + δ − α > δR, i.e. an extra assumption holds:
α < 1 + δ − δR. (E)
A3 makes A5 and E compatible.
If assumption E holds, then the slack optimum tS can be interior rather than the
corner solution 0, therefore introducing notations χ = 1−αR−1 and κ = 1+δ(1−R)−α,
tS satisfies
V˜ ′(t) =
−χ
1− χt +
κ
δR+ κt
= 0. (10)
Solving a linear equation yields
tS =
κ− δRχ
2κχ
.
Any negative root should be replaced by zero.
Returning to the core of the model, we have
Theorem 2. Under assumptions A1–A5, there is a narrower welfare gap
(tS(α), tN(α)) in M2 which must be jumped.
It is difficult to argue that in real life, all the assumptions A1–A5 plus E hold. But
Feldstein’s extreme assumption of α ≈ 0 is not only ad hoc but is definitely unrealistic
and leads to the neglect of the T-optimum, which may be the true global optimum as
well.
Numerical illustration
We shall use the underestimation coefficient α = 0.5 in our numerical simulation. In
Table 3, the annual relative interest factor R[1] runs between 1.02 and 1.06, while the
annual discount factor δ[1] varies between 0.9 and 0.94. We only depict 3 × 3 pairs.
Obviously, occasionally we surpass the limits set by A4–A5, and we observe not only
superior but also inferior T-optima. Note that for low relative annual interest and
discount factors (1.02–1.04 and 0.9–0.92), the S-optimal tax rate is often equal to the
separator (suggesting that even the government preferred the worker saved a negative
amount). For higher relative interest factors (1.04–1.06) and high discount factor (0.94),
the separator tax rate is often higher than the T-optimal one, making the T-system
uniformly inferior to the S-system. Apart from these extremes, the picture is quite
clear: the T-optimum cannot be neglected.
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Table 3. Dependence of optima on the parameter values: M2
A n n u a l
relative S-optimal Separator Relative
interest discount t a x Worker Pensioner efficiency
f a c t o r r a t e s c o n s u m p t i o n of T w.r.t. S
R[1] δ[1] tS tW cS dS εT|S
1.02 0.90 0.133 0.133 0.867 0.385 1.472
0.92 0.229 0.229 0.771 0.662 1.190
0.94 0.311 0.361 0.670 0.998 1.040
1.04 0.90 0.216 0.216 0.784 0.623 1.216
0.92 0.171 0.347 0.791 0.854 1.034
0.94 0.000 0.503 0.865 1.266 0.812
1.06 0.90 0.140 0.327 0.836 0.791 1.045
0.92 0.000 0.485 0.924 1.257 0.788
0.94 0.000 0.642 0.865 2.243 0.610
Remark. α = 0.5
In summary, except for the extreme case of zero expected benefit (α = 0), Feld-
stein’s analysis is incomplete and misleading. Working with realistic parameter values
of α,R, δ, the optimal slack contribution rate may be much lower than the tight optimum
and may yield much lower welfare.
4. Pension with endogenous fertility
Model 3 (M3)
Our third model is based on Simonovits’ (2013) which in turn revised GLM. It is assumed
that one part of the tax (θ) supports child raising, and the other part of the tax (τ)
goes to the public pension system. With the extension to pensions, the fertility model
becomes quite complex, especially taking account of the existence of credit constraint.
We assume there is no real growth wage, i.e. relative and absolute interest factors
coincide and we replace parameter ν by a choice variable n.
We add new notations and equations to the old ones: pension contribution rate: τ ,
tax rate: θ, saving: s. We take the cost of raising a child independent of the net wage:
p, per child benefit: ϕ, fertility rate, i.e. the number of children per parent (half the
total fertility rate): n, the pay-as-you-go benefit: b; all positive real numbers. We retain
the heroic assumption of the literature: the number of children can be any positive real!
Young-age adult consumption (c) and old-age consumptions (d) are respectively
equal to
c = 1− τ − θ − s− (p− ϕ)n and d = ρs+ b. (11)
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The new lifetime utility function is equal to the old utility plus the utility of having
children:
U(c, n, d) = log c+ ζ logn+ δ log d, (12)
where ζ is the coefficient of the relative utility of having children and δ is the discount
factor; ζ > 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Introducing the net-of-contribution wage τˆ = 1− τ and inserting (11) into (12) yield
the reduced utility function:
U [s, n] = log(τˆ − θ − s− (p− ϕ)n) + ζ log n+ δ log(ρs+ b). (13)
Denoting the individual optimum by c(τ, θ), n(τ, θ), d(τ, θ) we define a paternalistic
social welfare function by replacing the discount factor δ with 1 in (12). Then our social
welfare function is an undiscounted utility:
V (τ, θ) = log c(τ, θ) + ζ log n(τ, θ) + log d(τ, θ). (14)
To learn if the credit constraint is slack or tight, we have to determine the separatrix
curve θ(τ) which separates the two domains in the (τ, θ)-plane. Delaying the proof, we
now only present
Lemma 3. a) The separatrix curve θ(τ) is given by
θ(τ) =
[δp− ζρ−1τ ]τˆ
δp+ ρ−1τ
, where 0 ≤ τ < ζ−1δpρ.
b) The separatrix curve starts from θ(0) = 1 and ends at θ(τM) = 0, where τM =
ζ−1δpρ; and θ(τ) is declining in [0, τM].
c) If 0 ≤ τ < τM and 0 < θ < θ(τ), then s(τ, θ) > 0: slack.
d) If 0 ≤ τ ≤ τM and θ(τ) ≤ θ ≤ τˆ , then s(τ, θ) = 0: tight.
e) If τM < τ ≤ 1− θ, then s(τ, θ) = 0: tight.
Slack credit constraint (S)
We continue the analysis with the slack credit constraint. Copying GLM, we take the
partial derivatives of (13) with respect to s and n yielding the first-order necessary
conditions for optimum:
0 = U ′s[s, n] =
−1
τˆ − θ − s− (p− ϕ)n +
δρ
ρs+ b
(15a)
and
0 = U ′n[s, n] =
−(p− ϕ)
τˆ − θ − s− (p− ϕ)n +
ζ
n
. (15b)
For the time being, we do not exclude negative savings.
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Lemma 4. The conditional optima are
c(τ, θ) =
τˆ − θ + ρ−1b
1 + δ + ζ
, d(τ, θ) = δρc(τ, θ) and n(τ, θ) =
ζ
p− ϕc(τ, θ).
In this model, the tax rate θ and pension b depend on fertility rate n, therefore we
introduce the transfer equations:
θ = ϕn (16a)
and
b = τn. (16b)
In words: a) the tax rate is equal to the product of the child benefit rate and fertility
rate; b) the pension benefit is equal to the product of the contribution and fertility.
The introduction of per-child support ϕ reduces the private cost of raising a child
from p to p − ϕ. If (16a) holds, there is no income effect. The introduction of the
contribution rate τ diminishes the young-age consumption by the same amount and
increases the old-age consumption according to b = τn [(16b)]. In a stationary economy
with n = 1, the two changes cancel each other; for falling/growing population, the
reduction of young-age consumption is greater/lower than the increase of the old-age
consumption. Using the concept of dynamic efficiency: ρ > n, the comparison above
changes. As is known, in a dynamically efficient economy, the introduction of a pay-as-
you-go pension is suboptimal etc, except for excessive myopia.
Inserting the transfer equations (16a)–(16b) into (15a)–(15b) yields the final optima
(see GLM):
Theorem 3. When the credit constraint is slack in M3 (Lemma 3c), then the
individually optimal young-age consumption and fertility rate are given respectively:
c∗S =
τˆ − θ[1− τ/(pρ)]
1 + δ + ζ − ζτ/(pρ) (17a)
and
n∗S =
ζτˆ + (1 + δ)θ
(1 + δ + ζ)p− ζρ−1τ . (17b)
Proof. Combining (15a) and (15b) leads to
pδρ
ρs+ τn
=
p
τˆ − s− pn =
ζ
n
+
δτ
ρs+ τn
.
With rearrangement,
s = ζ−1ρ−1[pδρ− (δ + ζ)τ ].
Rewrite (15a) as (ρs+ τn) = δρ(τˆ − s− pn) or
ρ(1 + δ)s = δρτˆ − (pδρ+ τ)n.
Inserting s into our last equation leads to (17a) and via n(τ, θ) to (17b).
Though we are unable to give a full picture of the dependence of social welfare on
the transfer rates in the slack region, we prove that the transfer-free system is a (local)
maximum for a large domain of the parameter space.
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Theorem 4. If ζ < 2, then the transfer-free system (τ∗S , θ
∗
S) = (0, 0) is a local
maximum, where the optimal outcomes are
c∗∗S =
1
1 + δ + ζ
, d∗∗S =
δρ
1 + δ + ζ
and n∗∗S =
ζ
(1 + δ + ζ)p
. (17∗)
Remarks. 1. The assumption ζ < 2 is quite mild. In fact, for τ = 0 = θ, the
locally optimal fertility rate is
n∗S =
ζ
(1 + δ + ζ)p
.
For example, for ζ = 2, p = 1/3 and δ = 1, the slack-optimal fertility rate is too high:
n∗S = 1.5.
2. Table 3 in Simonovits (2013) (omitted here) suggests that probably our local
maximum is also a global one in the slack region.
Proof. In this proof, we shall drop the subindex S and study the behavior of the
social welfare function (14). Take the partial derivatives with respect to the two transfer
rates:
V ′τ (τ, θ) =
c′τ (τ, θ)
c(τ, θ)
+ ζ
n′τ (τ, θ)
n(τ, θ)
+
d′τ (τ, θ)
d(τ, θ)
and
V ′θ (τ, θ) =
c′θ(τ, θ)
c(τ, θ)
+ ζ
n′θ(τ, θ)
n(τ, θ)
+
d′θ(τ, θ)
d(τ, θ)
.
Using d = δρc, the first and the third terms are equal in both equations. Moreover,
using (17) at τ = 0 = θ
c′τ (0, 0)
c(0, 0)
=
ζp−1ρ−1 − (ζ¯ + δ)
ζ¯ + δ
< 0 and
n′τ (0, 0)
n(0, 0)
= ζ−1
c′τ (0, 0)
c(0, 0)
.
Hence
V ′τ (τ, θ) = 3
c′τ (0, 0)
c(0, 0)
< 0.
By the linearity of c(0, θ) and n(0, θ), the elasticities are equal to 1 and –1, respectively,
i.e. V ′θ (0, 0) = −2 + ζ < 0 etc.
The second-order conditions are omitted.
Tight credit constraint (T)
We turn now to the tight credit constraint: s = 0. We have to replace condition
U ′s[s, n] = 0 [(15a)] by U
′
s[0, n] < 0 and then (15b) becomes U
′
n[0, n] = 0. By easy
calculation we obtain
(p− ϕ)n = ζc = ζ[τˆ − θ − (p− ϕ)n].
Inserting the budget condition θ = ϕn, and notation ζ¯ = 1 + ζ, we end-up with
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Theorem 5. a) When the credit constraint is tight (Lemma 4d and e), the optimal
fertility rate and the corresponding young-age consumption are respectively equal to
n∗T =
ζτˆ + θ
ζ¯p
and c∗T =
τˆ − θ
ζ¯
. (18)
b) The optimal fertility rate is a decreasing function of the contribution rate τ and
an increasing function of the tax rate θ.
Finally we are able to give the
Proof of Lemma 3. Inserting the formulas (17)–(18) respectively for n∗S and n
∗
T
into the separatrix’s equation, n∗S = n
∗
T results in
ζτˆ + (1 + δ)θ
(1 + δ + ζ)p− ζρ−1τ =
ζτˆ + θ
ζ¯p
.
With rearrangement, [ζτˆ+(1+δ)θ]ζ¯p = [ζτˆ+θ][(1+δ+ζ)p−ζρ−1τ ]. After simplification,
θ(τ) is obtained. For θ > θ(τ), s(τ, θ) = 0; for θ < θ(τ), s(τ, θ) > 0.
The separatrix in Lemma 3 is a fraction: its numerator is the product of two decreas-
ing positive functions and its denominator is an increasing positive function, therefore
the fraction is also declining.
Next we determine the socially optimal pair of contribution and tax rates in the
tight region.
Theorem 6. In the region of a tight credit constraint, the socially optimal contri-
bution and tax rates are equal respectively to
τ∗T = θ
∗
T =
1
3 + ζ
(19)
and the corresponding outcomes are
n∗∗T =
ζ
(1 + ζ)p
, c∗∗T =
1
3 + ζ
and d∗∗T =
1
(3 + ζ)2p
. (18∗)
Remarks. 1. It is easy to show that the optimal pair of transfer rates in (19)
generate tight credit constraint.
2. It is natural that the optimal fertility rate in (18*) is a decreasing function of the
relative utility of children but it is surprising that the two optimal transfer rates are
equal to each other and are independent of any other parameter value.
3. In both regions, the socially optimal child support is always lower than the
expenditure on children: 0 ≤ ϕ < p.
Proof. Our starting point is as follows:
V {τ, θ} = log τˆ − θ
ζ¯
+ ζ log
ζτˆ + θ
ζ¯p
+ log
τ(ζτˆ + θ)
ζ¯p
→ max .
Using the identity log(x/y) = log x − log y, the constant denominators can be
dropped. Returning to τˆ = 1− τ , we have then an equivalent problem:
V˜ {τ, θ} = log(1− τ − θ) + ζ¯ log(ζ(1− τ) + θ) + log τ → max .
13
Taking the partial derivatives of V˜ with respect to τ and θ and equate the derivatives
to zero yield the first-order necessary conditions:
0 = V˜ ′τ =
−1
1− τ − θ −
ζ¯ζ
ζ(1− τ) + θ +
1
τ
(20)
and
0 = V˜ ′θ =
−1
1− τ − θ +
ζ¯
ζ(1− τ) + θ . (21)
From (21),
θ =
1− τ
2 + ζ
= κ(1− τ). (22)
Inserting back (22) into (20),
−1
(1− κ)(1− τ) −
ζ¯ζ
(ζ + κ)(1− τ) +
1
τ
= 0.
Hence Theorem 6 is obtained.
Comparing the presumed welfare maxima of the two regions, the following quantity
plays an important role. The critical discount factor δ∗ = δ(p, ζ, ρ) is defined as the
discount factor (depending on the raising cost, on the relative child utility and on the
interest factor) for which the two systems achieve the same social welfare (cf. (17*) and
(18*)). The function δ(p, ζ, ρ) is to be determined from the following implicit equation:
V (0, 0) = V (τ∗T, θ
∗
T)
but it would not be helpful.
Obviously, if 0 < δ < δ(p, ζ, ρ), then the T-optimum is better than the S-optimum,
and vice versa. From now on we shall confine our attention to the T-case, which is
probably the more relevant and definitely the simpler case.
As before, we shall compare the welfare provided by a (τ, θ)-system with the transfer-
free system’s (0, 0) as follows. Let us define the relative efficiency of the former with
respect to the latter by the positive number ε(τ, θ) if multiplying the unit wage by ε
in the transfer-free system, the welfare would reach that value provided by the transfer
system with unitary wages. In formula:
V [ε, 0, 0] = V [1, τ, θ].
Due to the simple utility function (12), the optimal fertility rate is independent of the
wage and the optimal consumption pair are homogeneous linear functions of the wage.
Therefore
2 log ε(τ, θ)+log c(0, 0))+ζ logn(0, 0)+log d(0, 0) = log c(τ, θ)+ζ logn(τ, θ)+log d(τ, θ).
Hence log ε(τ, θ) or ε(τ, θ) can simply be determined:
2 log ε(τ, θ) + V [1, 0, 0] = V [1, τ, θ] i.e. ε(τ, θ) = exp[0.5(V [1, τ, θ]− V [1, 0, 0])].
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Numerical illustration
Here we numerically illustrate the simplest case of homogeneous fertility rate and pro-
portional pensions. Assume a 30-year long period between accumulation and decumu-
lation. To give room for an unfunded pension system, we assume δρ < 1.
Table 4 displays the critical discount factor for a fixed raising cost p = 0.35 for
selected points of a grid. For a fixed coefficient ζ, the higher the interest factor, the
lower the critical value. For example, for ζ = 0.4, as the annual interest factor ρ[1] rises
from 1.02 to 1.04, the annual critical factor δ∗[1] drops from 0.943 to 0.920. In parallel,
the steady state slack fertility rate rises from n∗S = 0.727 to 0.771, while n
∗
T = 1.176
remains invariant. Similarly, fixing ρ[1] = 1.03, as ζ rises from 0.3 to 0.5, the critical
δ∗[1] rises from 0.927 to 0.934, basically invariant.
Table 4. Critical discount factor function δ(ζ, ρ): M3
C o m p o u n d e d
Coefficient of critical O p t i m a l s t e a d y
relative Interest discount s t a t e f e r t i l i t y r a t e
utility factor factor slack tight
ζ ρ[1] δ∗[1] n∗S n
∗
T
0.3 1.02 0.938 0.593 1.126
1.03 0.927 0.611
1.04 0.916 0.625
0.4 1.02 0.943 0.727 1.176
1.03 0.931 0.753
1.04 0.920 0.771
0.5 1.02 0.946 0.846 1.224
1.03 0.934 0.877
1.04 0.924 0.897
Remark. p = 0.35, ζ = 0.4.
Choose the middle (italicized) row in Table 4: ζ = 0.4, but with some slight modifi-
cation: ρ[1] = 1.03 (the annual interest rate being 3%), and δ[1] = 0.92 (i.e. the annual
discount rate of 8%), well below the critical value 0.931.
Changing the contribution and the tax rates, their impact can be studied also nu-
merically. First we present the separatrix (discussed in Lemma 3). It declines from
1 to 0 while the contribution rate τ rises from 0 to 0.17. Second, from Theorem 3,
τ∗ = θ∗ = 0.294, close 0.3.
Table 5 displays the characteristics of the model along the diagonal with τ = θ. First
of all, note that the optimal saving is only positive for low enough contribution and tax
rates, namely until reaching τ = θ = 0.1. The relative efficiency reaches its S-maximum
between 0.15 and 0.2 (the neutral rate being close to 0.17) and then achieves the true
maximum close to 0.3.
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Table 5. The impact of the equal transfer rates: M3
Transfer Young-age Old-age Relative
rates Fertility rate Saving c o n s u m p t i o n efficiency
τ = θ n∗ s∗ c∗ d∗ ε
0.00 0.771 0.055 0.675 0.134 1.000
0.05 0.850 0.033 0.619 0.123 0.936
0.10 0.932 0.008 0.566 0.113 0.871
0.15 1.000 0 0.500 0.150 0.958
0.20 1.061 0 0.429 0.212 1.068
0.25 1.122 0 0.357 0.281 1.134
0.30 1.184 0 0.286 0.355 1.153
0.35 1.245 0 0.214 0.436 1.117
0.40 1.306 0 0.143 0.522 1.009
5. Conclusions
We have revisited three models of public pension systems, where a myopic representa-
tive individual and a paternalistic government play a Stackelberg-game. These models
(especially models 1 and 2) can easily be interpreted also as abstract transfer models.
In our models, we assumed that the private purchase is cheaper than the public trans-
fer. We were able to show or at least conjecture that even if the socially optimal tax
yields higher social welfare than the private system does, there is a welfare gap for lower
taxes which should be jumped. Model 1 (initiated in Simonovits (2015a)) only served
as a stepping stone to Models 2 and 3 (Simonovits, 2013). We have dissected two very
influential models: Feldstein (1985) and GLM (2003). Their authors overlooked the
coexistence of the S- and the T-optima and the welfare gap spanned between them. I
express my hope that the approach of the present paper can be applied to other transfer
models as well.
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